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Why and How the Supreme Court Should Have Decided O’Bannon v NCAA
Matthew J. Mitten*
Abstract
Despite requests by both parties, the United States Supreme Court refused to grant a writ of
certiorari in O’Bannon v. NCAA, the first federal appellate court decision holding that an NCAA
student-athlete eligibility rule violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit ruled that
NCAA rules prohibiting intercollegiate athletes from receiving any revenue from videogames
and telecasts incorporating their names, images, or likenesses unreasonably restrain economic
competition among its member universities in the college education market in which these
athletes purchase higher education services and sell their athletic services, which violates federal
antitrust law. Circuit court rulings conflict regarding whether student-athlete eligibility rules are
commercial restraints subject to the Sherman Act, and lower courts have inconsistently
interpreted and applied NCAA v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, the Supreme
Court’s only intercollegiate athletics antitrust law precedent. The Supreme Court’s refusal to
resolve this conflict continues the significant judicial confusion regarding how antitrust law
constrains the NCAA’s governance of intercollegiate athletics, which has evolved into a multibillion dollar part of the entertainment industry with millions of fans and more than 450,000
student-athletes. Its decision not to do also creates uncertainty regarding how lower courts will
resolve pending antitrust challenges to other NCAA amateurism rules and input market restraints
such as limits on the duration and maximum number of athletic scholarships per sport as well as
transfer rules. This article makes some recommendations for applying section 1 to NCAA
student-athlete eligibility rules and input market restraints, which will better promote consumer
welfare, protect student-athletes’ economic rights, and permit the NCAA to promote the unique
features of intercollegiate sports without unwarranted judicial micromanagement.
Key words: O’Bannon v NCAA; amateurism rules; input market restraint; rule of reason; less
restrictive alternative.
Introduction
O’Bannon v NCAA1 is the first federal appellate court decision holding that a National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) student-athlete eligibility rule unreasonably restrains
trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. More specifically, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
NCAA amateurism rules prohibiting student-athletes from receiving any revenue from
* Professor of Law and Executive Director, National Sports Law Institute and LL.M. in Sports
Law Program for Foreign Lawyers, Marquette University Law School; President, Sports
Lawyers Association. The views expressed herein are solely my own and are not those of any of
these organizations. The author expresses his gratitude to Jessica Goldstein for her excellent
research and editorial assistance.
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802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
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As published: Matthew J. Mitten, Why and How the Supreme Court Should Have Decided O'Bannon v.
NCAA, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 62, Issue No. 1, pp.62-90, Copyright © 2017, Reprinted by permission of
SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X17691383.

videogames and telecasts incorporating their names, images, or likenesses unreasonably restrain
economic competition among its member universities in the college education market in which
student-athletes purchase higher education services and sell their athletic services. Both sides
petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review O’Bannon, but the Supreme Court denied both
petitions despite: 1) conflicting rulings among circuit courts regarding whether student-athlete
eligibility rules are commercial restraints subject to the Sherman Act; 2) lower courts’
inconsistent interpretation and application of NCAA v Board of Regents of University of
Oklahoma (Board of Regents),2 its only intercollegiate athletics antitrust law precedent; and 3)
pending section 1 litigation challenging other NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and input
market restraints, which would benefit significantly from its guidance.
In particular, there is sharp disagreement among federal appellate courts regarding
whether student-athlete eligibility rules and their enforcement are valid as a matter of law, or
whether they should be subject to rule of reason scrutiny. There also are differing judicial views
concerning whether maintenance of NCAA-defined “amateurism” is appropriately characterized
as a procompetitive justification. In addition, there is no principled and uniform jurisprudence
applying section 1 to NCAA input market restraints that is consistent with generally accepted
and sports industry-specific antitrust law principles.
In prior scholarship, I advocated that NCAA amateurism eligibility rules prohibiting
price competition for student-athletes’ playing services constitute commercial restraints subject
to section 1 rule of reason analysis rather than being judicially presumed to be valid.3 However,
I recognize that the principled application of section 1 to input market restraints such as NCAA
student-athlete eligibility rules is a very complex, expensive, and time consuming endeavor and
that using antitrust law to create free market economic competition for intercollegiate athletes’
services may conflict with the achievement of legitimate social welfare objectives in higher
education. Thus, in subsequent scholarship, my co-authors and I argued in favor of alternative
intercollegiate athletics regulatory systems along with Congressional antitrust immunity if
certain conditions to achieve these objectives are satisfied, which continues to be my preferred
approach.4 Given the uncertainty of future Congressional adoption of either proposal, this article
asserts that the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in O’Bannon and suggests how it
2

468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time” College
Athletics: The Need to Shift From Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of Amateurism to the
Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1 (2000); Matthew J. Mitten,
University Price Competition for Elite Students and Athletes: Illusions and Realities, 36 SO. TEX.
L. REV. 59 (1995) [hereinafter Mitten, University Price Competition].
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Matthew J. Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the
Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 ORE. L. REV.
837 (2014); Matthew J. Mitten, James L. Musselman & Bruce W. Burton, Targeted Reform of
Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779 (2010).
2

should have decided this case, thereby clarifying the appropriate application of section 1 to
intercollegiate athletics input market restraints as well as providing guidance regarding its
application to professional sports and potentially other joint ventures.
This article begins by briefly comparing the key characteristics of NCAA intercollegiate
athletics (particularly Division I FBS football and men’s basketball) to major league professional
team sports. It then summarizes judicial application of section 1 to professional sports league
labor market restraints, which is followed by a corresponding discussion of its application by
courts to NCAA input market restraints, primarily those affecting student-athletes, including the
NCAA amateurism rule at issue in O’Bannon. Next, it summarizes the parties’ respective
petitions for a writ of certiorari and supporting amicus briefs, which identify several important
antitrust issues requiring Supreme Court resolution. It concludes by making some
recommendations for judicial application of section 1 to NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules
and other input market restraints, which is consistent with Board of Regents as well as Supreme
Court and lower court precedent applying antitrust law to professional sports leagues. Judicial
adoption of these recommendations would promote consumer welfare by maintaining the unique
features of college sports that distinguish them from professional sports, while also prohibiting
predominantly anticompetitive NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and other input market
restraints without inappropriate judicial micromanagement of intercollegiate athletics.
I. Similarities and Differences between NCAA Sports and Professional Team Sports
NCAA intercollegiate athletics and North American major league professional team
sports both are entertainment products consisting of athletic competitions with uncertain
outcomesrequiring some degree of competitive balance among teams playing the gamethat
have substantial commercial value because of their consumer popularity. The NCAA and North
American major league professional leagues produce many of the same sports (e.g., baseball,
basketball, football, hockey, soccer), which are played pursuant to essentially the same on-field
rules. Like the NFL and NBA,5 Division I FBS football and men’s basketball annually generate
multi-billion dollar revenues from live fan attendance, the sale of broadcasting rights, sponsors,
and other sources.6
5

For the 2014–2015 season, Forbes estimated that the NBA earned $5.2 billion in revenue.
Forbes Releases 18th Annual NBA Team Valuations, FORBES (Jan. 20, 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbespr/2016/01/20/forbes-releases-18th-annual-nba-teamvaluations/#529f71e76e3e. Forbes also estimated that the NFL earned over $13.3 billion in
revenue for the 2015–2016 season,. Jason Belzer, Thanks to Roger Goodell, NFL Revenues
Projected to Surpass $13 Billion in 2016, FORBES (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2016/02/29/thanks-to-roger-goodell-nfl-revenuesprojected-to-surpass-13-billion-in-2016/#12e2f44f3278.
6

In 2014, which was the first year of the College Football Playoff, bowl game revenues
generated by Division I FBS conferences and schools exceeded $500 million. In 2016, the
NCAA extended its television contract, with both CBS and Turner Sports, through 2032 for its
3

Professional sports leagues generally are comprised of privately owned, for-profit
member clubs that have the right to operate a team in a particular geographical location.
Professional team sport athletes are employees of their respective clubs, andthey have the right to
unionize under federal labor law.7 Major league professional players generally have done so,
and their respective labor unions (e.g., NFL Players Association, NBA Players Association)
collectively bargain the “wages, hours, and other working conditions” for all league players in
accordance with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).8
By comparison, the highest level of intercollegiate athletics are produced by nonprofit
institutions of higher education and regulated by the NCAA,9 an association of more than 1,100

Division I men’s basketball tournament, and will receive more than $1 billion annually
beginning in 2024. The Big Ten’s new media rights deals with Fox and ESPN will generate
$2.64 billion over the next six years; and Michigan, Ohio State, and UCLA signed apparel
contracts collectively worth more than $700 million. Glenn Wong, Accelerating the Pace of
Change for Division I Athletic Directors, SPORTS BUS. J., Nov. 28–Dec. 4, 2016, at 30.
According to the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, annual intercollegiate sports
revenue generated by the Division I Power Five Conferences, which consists of the 65 member
universities of the Atlantic Coast Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big Twelve Conference, Pac
Twelve Conference, and Southeastern Conference, will be $2.8 billion by 2020. Jake New,
College Sports’ Slow Pace of Change, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/12/07/over-three-decades-pushing-sports-reformknight-commission-touts-smallsignificant?utm_source=Inside+Higher+Ed&utm_campaign=101f9b37a9DNU20161207&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1fcbc04421-101f9b37a9197510237&mc_cid=101f9b37a9&mc_eid=bb78605517. Total fan attendance has slowing
become the area of college sports that draws the least amount of revenue. For example, in 2013,
the NCAA earned a total of $797 million in revenue, with $702 million coming from TV
contracts, $71.71 million coming from ticket sales to the Division I men’s basketball tournament,
and the rest presumably coming from attendance at the Division I women’s basketball
tournament and e at other, men’s and women’s NCAA championship competitions. College
Sports (NCAA)Statistics & Facts, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/topics/1436/collegesports-ncaa/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
7

Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs & Ass’n of Nat’l Baseball League Umpires, 180 N.L.R.B.
190 (1969) (National Labor Relations Board recognition that employees of professional sports
leagues (and by implication their member clubs) have right to unionize under federal labor law).
8

29 U.S.C. §§151 et seq.

9

The NCAA, originally named the Intercollegiate Athletic Association, was founded in 1905 to
change college football rules to make the sport safer in response to President Theodore
Roosevelt’s threat to ban it after several college players died while playing football. Rodney K.
4

member colleges and universities organized into three divisions. The NCAA also organizes and
sponsors annual championships for all its recognized sports except Division I FBS
footballwhich selects its national champion pursuant to the College Football Playoff system,
an agreement among its ten member conferences and independent individual universities.
Although very few athletic departments annually generate revenues exceeding their costs,10 “in
an extremely competitive higher education market, academic leaders use intercollegiate athletics
as a catalyst and means” to achieve broader university objectives, which include attracting well
qualified students who are fans of or participants in the university’s athletic teams; recruiting and
retaining high quality faculty members; increasing fund raising; and enhancing support for the
institution from a variety of constituencies.11
The NCAA's objective is “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”12
According to the NCAA, “[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and
social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises.”13 In other words, the NCAA seeks to preserve the amateur nature of college sports
as a component of higher education and to ensure competitive balance on the playing field.14
This idealized NCAA philosophy has been characterized as the “amateur/education
model” of intercollegiate athletics.15 Although college sports have been commercialized since
their inception in the 1850s,16 it aptly describes Division III intercollegiate

Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating
Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 10–13 (2000).
10

The most recent report published by the NCAA indicates that only 24 Division I university
athletic departments generated positive net revenues in 2014. 2004–14 NCAA REVENUES &
EXPENSES DIVISION I REPORT 28 (2015).
11

Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra note 4, at 792.

12

2016–17 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 1.3.1 (2016) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].

13

Id. art. 2.9.

14

It also establishes requirements and guidelines to protect participating student-athletes’ health
and safety. See, e.g., 2014–15 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK (2015),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/MD15.pdf.
15

Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 269, 270 (1994).
5

athleticsparticipating college athletes are not permitted to receive athletic scholarshipsas
well as Division I and II women’s and men’s sports that do not generate net revenues.
There is a contractual relationship between intercollegiate athletes and their respective
universities17 into which NCAA academic, amateurism, and other eligibility rules are
incorporated. All athletes must be full-time students who meet minimum initial academic
eligibility and progress towards degree requirements; they also have a maximum duration of
intercollegiate athletics eligibility (generally 4-5 years).18 Division I and II intercollegiate
athletes are permitted to receive full or partial athletic scholarships, but NCAA “amateurism
rules” cap the scholarship’s value and restrict the economic benefits the athletes may receive
from their respective universities, or third parties, for their playing services.19 The rules also
prohibit athletes from receiving any payments for college athletics accomplishments or fame.20
Because these sports generate multi-billion dollars revenues, Division I FBS football and
men’s basketball are based on a “commercial/education model”21 of intercollegiate sports.
However, commercialized college sports are “not subject to the same economic forces as purely
commercial enterprises like professional sports” for the following reasons:
. . . . [A]thletic directors seek to maximize the commercial return on big-time
sports, [but] nonprofit universities do not distribute the profits generated by
commercially successful football and men’s basketball programs to shareholders.
Indeed, athletic directors are typically motivated to spend surplus revenues from
football and men’s basketball programs on socially worthy causes, which often
include a broad range of intercollegiate sports for elite athletes that do not
generate sufficient revenues to pay for their costs, and occasionally subsidies for
university academic and educational programs.22

16

Mitten & Ross, supra note 4, at 840 (observing that “[t]he first intercollegiate athletic
competition, a rowing competition between Harvard and Yale in 1852, was sponsored by a
railroad seeking to attract passengers via its new route to the lake on which this event took
place.”).
17

See, e.g., Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. App. 1972).

18

See generally MATTHEW J. MITTEN, ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 123–27 (3d ed. 2013).
19

NCAA MANUAL, supra note 12, art. 16.11.2

20

Id. art. 12.1.2.1.5.

21

Davis, supra note 15, at 279.

22

Mitten & Ross, supra note 4, at 841–42.
6

Similar to NFL and NBA coaches,23 several Division I FBS football and men’s basketball
head coaches for these college sports earn multi-million dollar annual salaries,24 Twelve Division
I FBS assistant football coaches make at least $1 million.25 Although 2013–14 average annual
NFL and NBA player salaries were $2 million and $4.9 million,26 respectively, reflecting their
substantial economic value to their teams, the NCAA’s amateurism rules prohibit all
intercollegiate athletes, including Division I FBS football and men’s basketball players, who also
have substantial economic value to their universities,27 from being paid any cash compensation
for their playing services. The only (and maximum) direct economic benefit they are permitted to

23

During the 2015–16 NBA season, Gregg Popovich, head coach of the San Antonio Spurs,
earned $11 million, making him the highest paid NBA coach. Top 10 Highest Paid NBA
Coaches in 2015–16, SPORTIGE (Jan. 14, 2016), http://sportige.com/top-10-highest-paid-nbacoaches-90570/. For the 2016 season, Sean Payton, head coach of the New Orleans Saints, will
earn $8 million, making him the highest paid NFL coach. Nat Berman, Top 10 NFL Coaching
Salaries for the 2016 Season, MONEY INC (Aug. 9, 2016), http://moneyinc.com/nfl-coachingsalaries-for-the-2016-season/.
24

In 2016, the top 25 highest-paid men’s college basketball coaches all made more than $2.2
million, with the top three earning $6.4 million (John Calipari, Kentucky), $6.03 million (Mike
Krzyzewski, Duke), and $6 million (Rick Pitino, Louisville) million. Top 25 Highest-Paid
College Basketball Coaches, SPORTING NEWS (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-basketball/photos/highest-paid-richest-college-basketballhoops-coaches-calipari-coach-k/2oij4dpoac5y1a82xm2pk2mb6/slide/429806. The top 10
highest-paid football coaches made more than $4.4 million each, with the top three earning
$7.09 million (Nick Saban, Alabama), $7.004 million (Jim Harbaugh, Michigan), and $5.86
million (Urban Meyer, Ohio State). The Highest-Paid College Football Coaches in 2016, AOL
(Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.aol.com/article/2016/08/25/who-are-the-highest-paid-collegefootball-coaches-in-2016/21458856/#slide=4027352#fullscreen.
25

Steve Berkowitz & Christopher Schnaars, $1M Club Grows in College Football, USA TODAY,
Dec. 8, 2016, at 1A.
26

Kurt Badenhausen, Average MLB Player Salary Nearly Doubles NFL’s, but Still Trails NBA’s,
FORBES (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2015/01/23/average-mlbsalary-nearly-double-nfls-but-trails-nba-players/#3f1f1ac0269e.
27

It is estimated that the average Division I FBS football is worth $163,869 per year. Cork
Gaines, The Average University of Texas Football Player is Now Worth More Than $670,000
Per Year, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/college-football-playervalue-2016-10.
7

receive is the value of a full cost-of-attendance athletic scholarship at their respective
universities.28
Although a full cost of attendance athletics scholarship has a substantial economic value29
and is at least arguably “pay” in the form of in kind higher educational benefits for college sports
playing services, courts have refused to characterize student-athletes as “employees” for
purposes of state worker’s compensation laws.30 In Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, the Indiana Supreme Court observed that “scholarship recipients are considered to be
students seeking advanced educational opportunities and are not considered to be professional
athletes.”31 Courts also have ruled that student-athletes are not employees under the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act because “the long tradition of amateurism in college sports, by definition,
shows that student athleteslike all other amateur athletesparticipate in their sports for
reasons wholly unrelated to immediate compensation . . . and have done so for over 100 years
under the NCAAwithout any real expectation of earning an income.”32
In Northwestern University and College Athletes Players Association, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) determined that, even if Northwestern University scholarship football

28

At the 2015 NCAA Annual Convention, the Power Five Conferences exercised their autonomy
authority by voting to permit their members to offer full athletic scholarships equal in value to
the full cost-of-attendance at their respective universities. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy
Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance Scholarships, NCAA.ORG (Jan. 18, 2015),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/autonomy-schools-adopt-cost-attendancescholarships. Beginning with the 2015–2016 academic year, this legislation enables universities
to provide athletic scholarships that include “[s]tipends, determined by institutions under
federally created guidelines.” Mitch Sherman, Full Cost of Attendance Passes 79-1, ESPN (Jan.
18, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/12185230/power-5-conferences-passcost-attendance-measure-ncaa-autonomy-begins.
29

For example, its estimated annual value is $68,095 for student-athletes at Northwestern
University, and $34,752 for an in-state student-athlete at the University of California, Los
Angeles, a public university. Christopher Smith, Full Cost of Attendance: What Will it Mean for
Power Five Players?, SATURDAY DOWN S. (Apr. 10, 2015),
http://www.saturdaydownsouth.com/sec-football/full-cost-of-attendance-explained/.
30

See, e.g., Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983); Waldrep v.
Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336
N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
31

Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1174.

32

Berger v NCAA, 2016 WL 7051905, at *5 (7th Cir. 2016).
8

players are employees under the NLRA, “it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert
jurisdiction.”33 The Board stated:
[o]ur decision is primarily premised on a finding that, because of the nature of
sports leagues (namely the control exercised by the leagues over the individual
teams) and the composition and structure of [Division I] FBS football (in which
the overwhelming majority of competitors are public colleges and universities
over which the Board cannot assert jurisdiction), it would not promote stability in
labor relations to assert jurisdiction in this case.34
Observing that “this case involves novel and unique circumstances,”35 the NLRB
explained:
[S]cholarship players are unlike athletes in undisputedly professional leagues,
given that [they] are required, inter alia, to be enrolled full time as students and
meet various academic requirements, and they are prohibited by NCAA
regulations from engaging in many of the types of activities that professional
athletes are free to engage in, such as profiting from the use of their names or
likenesses. . . . [E]ven if scholarship players were regarded as analogous to
players for professional sports teams who are considered employees for purposes
of collective bargaining, such bargaining has never involved a bargaining unit
consisting of a single team’s players, where the players for competing teams were
unrepresented or entirely outside the Board’s jurisdiction.
. . . As in professional sports . . . uniform rules of competition and compliance
with them ensure the uniformity and integrity of individual games, and thus
league competition as a whole. There is thus a symbiotic relationship among the
various teams, the conferences, and the NCAA. As a result, labor issues directly
involving only an individual team and its players would also affect the NCAA, the
Big Ten, and the other member institutions. Many terms applied to one team
therefore would likely have ramifications for other teams. . . . [S]uch an
arrangement is seemingly unprecedented; all previous Board cases concerning
professional sports involve leaguewide bargaining units.36

33

N. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 2015 WL 4882656, at *1
(Aug. 17, 2015).
34

Id. at *3.

35

Id. at *4.

36

Id. at *4–5.
9

Some states have laws that effectively prohibit intercollegiate athletes at public
universities from unionizing under state labor laws applicable to public employees.37 As a result
of Northwestern University and these state laws, intercollegiate athletes currently do not have the
legal right to unionize and collectively bargain any of the terms of their contracts with NCAA
universities, which effectively would immunize any agreed terms from antitrust challenge
pursuant to the nonstatutory labor exemption.
II. Judicial Application of Section 1 to Professional Sports League Labor Market Restraints
Professional sports league clubs’ collectively imposed labor market restraints on players,
such as fixing their compensation, rules determining their eligibility to play in the league, or
preventing their ability to choose their teams, are input market restraints that are subject to and
may violate section 1 under well-established precedent. In Mandeville Island Farms v. American
Crystal Sugar Co.,38 the Supreme Court held that an agreement among California sugar refiners
who sell sugar in interstate commerce to pay a uniform price for sugar beets grown in California
states a claim under section 1. “It is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination
condemned by the Act, even though the price-fixing was by purchasers, and the persons specially
injured under the treble damage claim are sellers, not customers or consumers.”39 It reasoned that
the Sherman Act “is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated”40 because “[t]he policy
of the Act is competition,” which “cannot be flouted”41 by concerted price fixing by group of
buyers.
Although Mandeville Island Farms held that fixing the price of inputs necessary to
produce a product is per se illegal, courts generally analyze the legality of restraints that fixed
the price of professional athletes’ wages under the rule of reason. In Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc.,42 a Washington, D.C. federal district court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that an agreement
among NFL clubs “to pay all Developmental Squad players a flat sum of $1,000 per week,
regardless of any individual player's background, skill, or potential, is a per se violation of the
37

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.56 (West 2016) (“Notwithstanding any provision of
the Revised Code to the contrary, a student attending a state university as defined in section
3345.011 of the Revised Code is not an employee of the state university based upon the student's
participation in an athletic program offered by the state university.”). See also MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 423.201(1)(e)(iii) (2016).
38

334 U.S. 219 (1948).

39

Id. at 235.

40

Id. at 236.

41

Id. at 243.

42

1992 WL 88039 (D.D.C. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1041(D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d,
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
10

Sherman Act.”43 The court analyzed it under the rule of reason because the clubs are engaged in
a joint venture to produce an entertainment product (i.e., on-field competition among
professional football teams), which cannot be produced by a single club and necessarily requires
their cooperation, and they offered legitimate procompetitive justifications for this restraint.
Applying the rule of reason, the court initially determined that this restraint has the significant
anticompetitive effect of precluding all Developmental Squad players from negotiating their
salary with any NFL clubs. It explained that if the restraint “has legitimate business purposes
which would promote competition, the court must then balance [its] ‘anticompetitive evils’ . . .
against its ‘procompetitive virtues.’”44 It found that the clubs did not prove this salary restraint
“enhances competition in the labor market for professional football players”45 or promotes onfield competitive balance among them. Because the clubs failed to establish it is necessary to
achieve either procompetitive objective, the court held that its significant anticompetitive effects
rendered it unlawful under the rule of reason. It granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment because the undisputed facts established that the salary restraint has clear net
anticompetitive effects, thereby obviating the need for any fact finding and balancing by a jury or
the court.
Courts generally have held that unilaterally determined league ruleswhich are the
product of an agreement among its clubs that are competitors for players’
services46establishing player eligibility requirements,47 a draft for entry level players,48 and
restrictions on the ability of veteran players to choose a new team after their current contracts
expire49 also violate the rule of reason.50 For example, in Smith v. Pro Football (which Brown
relied on), the District of Columbia Circuit explained:
43

Id. at *6.

44

Id. at *9.

45

Id. at *9.

46

See, e.g., McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).

47

Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d on other grounds, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.
2004). Some early cases such as Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp.
1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), held that such restraints are per se illegal, but these cases subsequently
have been effectively overruled by American Needle and Board of Regents, which require
application of the rule of reason to most sports industry restraints. See infra notes 55-56, 67 and
accompanying text.
48

Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); McNeil v NFL, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn.
1992).
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Fraser v. Major League Soccer LLC, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 885 (2002),
is one of the few cases in which a major professional sports league labor market restraint was
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a player draft can survive scrutiny under the rule of reason only if it is
demonstrated to have positive, economically procompetitive benefits that offset
its anticompetitive effects, or, at the least, if it is demonstrated to accomplish
legitimate business purposes and to have a net anticompetitive effect that is
insubstantial.51
It upheld the district court’s bench trial verdict that the then-existing 16-round NFL player draft
is an unreasonable restraint of trade:
The draft is anticompetitive in its effect on the market for players’ services,
because it virtually eliminates economic competition among buyers for the
services of sellers. The draft is allegedly “procompetitive” in its effect on the
playing field; but the NFL teams are not economic competitors on the playing
field, and the draft, while it may heighten athletic competition and thus improve
the entertainment product offered to the public, does not increase competition in
the economic sense of encouraging others to enter the market and to offer the
product at lower cost. Because the draft’s “anticompetitive” and “procompetitive”
effects are not comparable, it is impossible to “net them out” in the usual rule-ofreason balancing. The draft’s “anticompetitive evils,” in other words, cannot be
balanced against its “procompetitive virtues,” and the draft be upheld if the latter
outweigh the former. In strict economic terms, the draft’s demonstrated
procompetitive effects are nil.52
Smith also held that an anticompetitive labor market restraint will be invalidated if
“significantly less anticompetitive alternatives” exist to achieve the league’s procompetitive
objective of achieving competitive balance among its clubs.53 For example, permitting multiple
clubs to draft a player, a draft with fewer rounds “applying only to the most talented players and
enabling their ‘average’ brethren to negotiate in a ‘free market,’” or to replace the draft with
found not to violate antitrust law. Plaintiffs, a group of professional soccer players, failed to
prove that the challenged restraints imposed by Major League Soccer, a U.S. league, have
significant anticompetitive effects because there is an international market for the services of
professional soccer players “to which players can turn, as a practical matter, for alternate
opportunities for employment.” Id. at 63.
51

Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188.

52

Id. at 1186. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 409 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d on other grounds,
369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the NFL cannot justify rule that “limits competition in
the player personnel market but enhances competition in the market for sports entertainment”
because the later is “a different market”).
53

Smith, 593 F.2d at 1187. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 410 (“The antitrust laws do not
tolerate a policy that restrains trade—even if there is some procompetitive benefit—when a
policy that results in less prejudice to competition would be equally effective.”).
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“revenue-sharing to equalize the teams' financial resources [as] a method of preserving
‘competitive balance.’”54
Smith’s holding that the anticompetitive effects of a labor market restraint cannot be
justified by procompetitive effects that enhance a sports league’s ability to compete in the
entertainment market, an output market different from the restrained input market, has been
effectively overruled. In American Needle, Inc. v. NFL,55 the Supreme Court subsequently
recognized that a professional sports league’s interest in maintaining competitive balance among
its member clubs is “legitimate and important,” which is “unquestionably an interest that may
well justify a variety of collective decisions made by the teams” under the rule of reason.
American Needle strongly suggests that a sports league can justify a labor market restraint
reasonably necessary to promote competitive balance among its member clubs.56
Because North American major professional league players have chosen to unionize and
courts have construed the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption very broadly, there have
been very few antitrust suits challenging professional sports labor market restraints for the past
25 years. This exemption precludes the parties (i.e. league, clubs, union, and players) from
challenging the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) on antitrust grounds, which
furthers the strong federal labor policy permitting employees, including professional athletes, to
unionize and collectively bargain their wages and working conditions.57 In a series of cases from
1976–1987, federal appellate courts held that CBA terms are not subject to antitrust challenge,
thereby permitting league clubs and the players union to agree to contract terms that otherwise
may violate antitrust law.58
In Wood v. NBA, the Second Circuit explained:
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Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188.
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560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010).
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See generally id. This view is consistent with Supreme Court antitrust precedent not involving
the sports industry recognizing that a reduction in intrabrand economic competition among
sellers of the same branded product may have the procompetitive effect of preserving or
enhancing interbrand economic competition among sellers of competing products. See Cont’l
T.V., Inc. v GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See also Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091,
1111–113 (1st Cir. 1994) (procompetitive effects in a closely related market (i.e., those that
enhance a professional sports league’s ability to more effectively compete with other forms of
entertainment) should be balanced against a restraint’s anticompetitive effects).
57

Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers, Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
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See, e.g., Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d
1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Freedom of contract is an important cornerstone of national labor
policy . . . . Courts cannot hope to fashion contract terms more efficient than those
arrived at by the parties who are to be governed by them. . . .
[It] is particularly important in the context of collective bargaining between
professional athletes and their leagues. Such bargaining relationships raise
numerous problems with little or no precedent in standard industrial relations. As
a result, leagues and player unions may reach seemingly unfamiliar or strange
agreements. If courts were to intrude and to outlaw such solutions, leagues and
their player unions would have to arrange their affairs in a less efficient way.59
In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,60 the Supreme Court held that the nonstatutory labor
exemption immunizes all restraints on the labor market for players’ services (e.g., player drafts,
team or individual player salary caps, and player free agency restrictions) from antitrust
challengeas long as there is an ongoing collective bargaining process between the league and
the players union. If there is, federal labor law exclusively governs labor relations between the
parties.
III. Judicial Application of Section 1 to NCAA Input Market Restraints Affecting College
Athletes
Prior to NCAA v. Board of Regents,61 the Supreme Court’s 1984 landmark decision
regarding the application of antitrust law to NCAA governance of intercollegiate athletics, lower
courts consistently rejected antitrust challenges to NCAA rules creating input market restrictions
affecting coaches and student-athletes. In Hennessey v. NCAA,62 the Fifth Circuit ruled that,
although the NCAA has no blanket antitrust immunity merely because it is a nonprofit joint
venture of institutions of higher education, limiting the number of coaches for particular
intercollegiate sports is not an unreasonable restraint of trade. Some courts held that NCAA
student-athlete eligibility rules to promote amateurism in college sports and/or to protect its
members’ academic standards are noncommercial restraints that “[d]o not come within the
purview of the Sherman Act.”63 Others concluded, without any supporting evidence, that such
rules and their enforcement are a reasonable means of achieving these objectives and promoting
fair competition in intercollegiate athletics.64
59

Wood, 809 F.2d at 961.
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518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Coll. Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL 998, at *4 (D.N.J.),
aff’d, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974). See Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
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See, e.g., Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz.1983).
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In Board of Regents, the Court confirmed that the NCAA is subject to antitrust law
because its regulatory activities affect interstate commerce. It noted that the “NCAA is an
association of schools which compete against each other to attract television revenues, not to
mention fans and athletes;”65 thereby recognizing that its rules and decisions are the product of
an agreement among its members that satisfies section 1’s concerted action requirement.
Although it affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s holding that the NCAA’s exclusive sale of college
football television broadcasting rights violates section 1, it reversed its determination that it is
per se illegal horizontal price fixing and output limitation. Because intercollegiate athletics is
“an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product[athletic
competition among NCAA universities]is to be available at all,”66 the Court held that the rule
of reason applies in analyzing this restraint’s “impact on competitive conditions.”67
Because it limits the total number of televised college football games below the output in
a free market (and fixes the price of broadcast rights), the NCAA’s television plan has clear
anticompetitive effects and harms consumer welfare. Thus, the NCAA has “a heavy burden of
establishing an affirmative defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the
operations of a free market.”68 The Court recognized maintenance of brand differentiation and
competitive balance as two procompetitive justifications for NCAA restraints with
anticompetitive effects. It stated: “the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—
college football” and “[t]he identification of this ‘product’ with an academic tradition
differentiates [it] from . . . professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable.”69 It
explained that “the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and
diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman
Act.”70 Because the NCAA football television plan was not necessary to further either of these
procompetitive objectives, the Court held that it violated the rule of reason.
In dicta, the Court stated: “[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product’
[college sports], athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”71 It
observed: “The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of
amateurism in college sports. There can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to play
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Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99.
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Id. at 101.
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Id. at 103.
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Id. at 113.
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Id. at 120.
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that role.”72 It also agreed with the NCAA’s contention that “maintaining competitive balance
among amateur athletic teams is legitimate and important.”73
Although it was not necessary to consider any less restrictive alternatives to support its
conclusion that the NCAA football television plan was an unreasonable restraint because it was
“not even arguably tailored to serve” competitive balance among NCAA schools, the Court
noted several other NCAA restrictions “better tailored” and “clearly sufficient” to achieve this
objective.74
After Board of Regents, federal appellate courts generally continued to rule that NCAA
student-athlete eligibility rules and their enforcement by disciplinary sanctions are valid as a
matter of law because they are 1) noncommercial restraints not subject to antitrust scrutiny; or 2)
commercial restraints that are a presumptively reasonable means of promoting brand
differentiation, competitive balance, or amateurism in intercollegiate athletics.
In Banks v. NCAA,75 the Seventh Circuit held that the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no agent”
rules, which resulted in a Notre Dame student-athlete’s loss of eligibility to play college football
when he entered the NFL draft and agreed to be represented by an agent in that sport, is not a
commercial restraint that causes antitrust injury. It reasoned that “[n]one of the NCAA rules
affecting college football eligibility restrain trade in the market for college players because the
NCAA does not exist as a minor league training ground for future NFL players but rather to
provide an opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a collegiate
education.”76 Similarly, in Smith v. NCAA,77 the Third Circuit dismissed an allegation that the
NCAA’s postbaccalaureate bylaw, which precluded a graduate student from participating in
intercollegiate athletics at a university other than the one at which she earned her undergraduate
degree, violates section 1. The court concluded that “eligibility rules are not related to the
NCAA’s commercial or business activities;” therefore, “the Sherman Act does not apply.”78
Relying on Smith, the Sixth Circuit, in Bassett v. NCAA,79 held that the “NCAA’s rules on
recruiting student athletes, specifically those rules prohibiting improper inducements and
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academic fraud, are all explicitly non-commercial.”80 The court affirmed the dismissal of a
section 1 claim by a former college football coach who had been disciplined for violating them.
In McCormick v. NCAA,81 the Fifth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that NCAA
student-athlete amateurism eligibility rules are commercial restraints subject to rule of reason
scrutiny. Relying on Board of Regents, it dismissed an allegation that these rules constitute pricefixing in violation of section 1. In upholding their validity as a matter of law, the court explained:
The essential inquiry under the rule-of-reason analysis is whether the challenged
restraint enhances competition. Applying this test, we have little difficulty in
concluding that the challenged restrictions are reasonable. The Supreme Court
indicated strongly in Board of Regents [by stating] . . . ‘In order to preserve the
character and quality of the “product,” athletes must not be paid, must be
required to attend class, and the like.’ . . . The NCAA markets college football as
a product distinct from professional football. The eligibility rules create the
product and allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures. The goal
of the NCAA is to integrate athletics with academics. Its requirements reasonably
further this goal.
. . . We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts that
would carry their antitrust claim and that the motion to dismiss was properly
granted.82
In Agnew v. NCAA,83 the Seventh Circuit diverged from (or at least clarified) Banks by
expressing “the view that the Sherman Act applies to the NCAA bylaws generally” 84 because
despite their nonprofit status, NCAA universities enter into commercial transactions with
premier athletes by providing scholarships for their playing services that can generate millions of
dollars in revenues. Thus, all NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and other input market
restrictions are commercial restraints. According to the court and consistent with McCormick,
“[m]ost—if not all—eligibility rules . . . fall comfortably within the presumption of
procompetitiveness afforded to certain NCAA regulations”85 despite being commercial restraints.
80

Id. at 433.
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845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
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Id. at 1344–345 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)). See Smith, 139
F.3d at 187 (“we think that the bylaw so clearly survives a rule of reason analysis that we do not
hesitate upholding it by affirming [its dismissal] for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted”).
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Distinguishing between NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and other restraints such
as a maximum number of allowable scholarships per sport and its then-existent one-year limit on
the duration of athletic scholarships, the Seventh Circuit explained the rationale for presuming
that eligibility rules are valid for purposes of antitrust law:
The NCAA’s limitation on athlete compensation beyond educational
expenses . . . directly advances the goal of maintaining a “clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports,” and thus is
best categorized as an eligibility rule aimed at preserving the existence of
amateurism and the student-athlete. The Bylaws at issue in this case, on the other
hand, are not directly related to the separation of amateur athletics from pay-forplay athletics, as explained in the preceding paragraphs. Nor do they help preserve
the existence of the student-athlete (as a facial matter, anyway), since they
actually limit the number of athletes awarded financial aid and the amount of
financial aid that an athlete can be awarded. Thus, financial aid rules do not
always assist in the preservation of amateurism or the existence of studentathletes, so the regulations at issue cannot be presumptively procompetitive
simply because they relate to financial aid.86
Two other pre-O’Bannon federal appellate court cases involving input price fixing
agreements among universities are relevant regarding the antitrust validity of NCAA input
market restraints affecting college athletes. In Law v. NCAA,87 the Tenth Circuit held that the
NCAA’s Restricted Earnings Coach (REC) rule limiting the annual compensation of certain
Division I entry-level coaches to $16,000 violated the “quick look” rule of reason because the
NCAA did not prove it furthered a procompetitive justification. Characterizing the REC rule as
“a horizontal agreement to fix prices,”88 the court found it is not “necessary to produce
competitive intercollegiate sports.”89 It concluded that the NCAA’s objectives of retaining
entry-level coaching positions and cutting costs are not valid procompetitive justifications.
In United States v. Brown University,90 the Antitrust Division alleged that an agreement
among the members of the Ivy Overlap Group (the eight Ivy League universities and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) to award financial aid only on the basis of need, to share
financial information regarding admitted students, and to jointly develop and apply a uniform
need analysis violated section 1. The Third Circuit held that nonprofit educational institutions’
“determination of financial assistance to students is part and parcel of the process of setting
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tuition and thus a commercial transaction” to which the Sherman Act applies.91 Because this
restraint “eliminate[s] price competition for talented students,” it is facially anticompetitive and
“cannot be justified solely on the basis of social welfare concerns”92 such as increasing the
socioeconomic diversity of their student bodies. The court concluded that the full rule of reason
applied in determining its reasonableness because defendant MIT offered procompetitive
justifications. Citing Board of Regents, it recognized enhanced “consumer appeal of an Overlap
education” and “consumer choice” (i.e., providing “students who otherwise would not have been
able to afford an Overlap education the opportunity to have one”) as procompetitive
justifications.93
O’Bannon v. NCAA’s determination that agreements among universities to fix input
market prices must be justified by a procompetitive objective under the rule of reason is
consistent with Law and Brown University, although it diverges from circuit court precedent
holding that NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules (including those that effectively fix prices)
are valid as a matter of law. In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit ruled that NCAA amateurism rules
preventing current and former Division I basketball and FBS football players from receiving any
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (“NIL compensation rules”) in
videogames and televised games is a commercial restraint “within the ambit of the Sherman
Act.”94 It distinguished Smith because the NCAA’s postbaccalaureate bylaw is “a true
‘eligibility’ rule akin to” its academic eligibility rules and those limiting the number of seasons
student-athletes can play intercollegiate sports.95 Characterizing Bassett’s holding that NCAA
amateurism rules are noncommercial as “simply wrong,” the Ninth Circuit failed to understand
its reasoning that “rules that seek to combat commercialism in college sports by preventing
schools from competing to pay student-athletes cannot be considered restraints on
‘commerce.’”96 The court disagreed with the NCAA’s assertion that its amateurism rules are
valid as a matter of law under Board of Regents and found Agnew “unpersuasive” to the extent it
supports this contention.97 It held that the “amateurism rules’ validity must be proved, not
presumed.”98
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To determine if the NCAA’s NIL compensation rules constitute an unreasonable restraint
of trade, the Ninth Circuit applied the same three-step full rule of reason analysis as did the
district court:
[1] The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the restraint produces
significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market. [2] If the plaintiff
meets this burden, the defendant must come forward with evidence of the
restraint’s procompetitive effects. [3] The plaintiff must then show that any
legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.99
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the following rulings by the district court: based on
Mandeville Island Farms, the restraint fixes the price of one element of competition (i.e., NIL
rights) at zero in the college education market in which NCAA universities compete for the
services of student-athletes; NIL compensation rules serve “the two procompetitive
purposes . . . [of] integrating academics with athletics, and ‘preserving the popularity of the
NCAA’s product by promoting its current understanding of amateurism;’”100 these rules “do not
promote competitive balance, . . . do not increase output in the college education market,
and . . . play a limited role in integrating student-athletes with their schools’ academic
communities.”101 Although it recognized that “a restraint that broadens choices can be
procompetitive,”102 the court rejected the NCAA’s assertion that “denying student-athletes
compensation apart from scholarships”103 does. It reasoned that “loosening or abandoning the
compensation rules might be the best way to ‘widen’ recruits range of choices.”104 For example,
“athletes might well be more likely to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew that
they were earning some amount of NIL income while they were in school.”105
Regarding the less restrictive alternative prong of rule of reason analysis, the Ninth
Circuit stated that “plaintiffs must make a strong evidentiary showing” that its proposed
alternative is “viable” and “‘virtually as effective’ in serving the procompetitive purposes of the
NCAA’s current rules, and without significant costs.”106 The court observed it “must generally
afford the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to superintend college athletics” and “‘plenty of room . . . to
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preserve the amateur character of intercollegiate athletics.’”107 Applying this standard, the panel
ruled that allowing NCAA schools to award full cost of attendance scholarships (which have
been permissible since August 2015) is a substantially less restrictive alternative to the NCAA’s
NIL compensation rules, which would be an effective means of integrating academics with
athletics and maintaining amateurism in intercollegiate athletics without significantly increasing
their costs. It affirmed the district court’s injunction requiring the NCAA to allow its members
to provide compensation up to the full cost of attending their respective institutions.
The Ninth Circuit majority held that the district court erred in determining that permitting
NCAA schools to provide pro rata cash payments to football and basketball players of no less
than $5,000 for each year of sports participation after they left college or their eligibility expires
is also a substantially less restrictive alternative to the NCAA’s current NIL compensation
rules.108 The district court reasoned that no evidence established that “consumer demand for the
NCAA’s product would decrease if schools were permitted to provide such stipends” or that
doing so “would hinder any school’s efforts to educate its student-athletes or integrate them into
the academic community.”109 They disagreed that “allowing students to be paid NIL
compensation unrelated to their education expenses, is ‘virtually as effective’ in preserving
amateurism as not allowing compensation” because not paying student-athletes is precisely what
makes them amateurs.”110 In reaching this conclusion, they effectively ruled that antitrust law
permits the NCAA to prohibit student-athletes from receiving “cash payments untethered to their
education expenses.”111
Acknowledging that his disagreement with the majority “largely boils down to a
difference in opinion as the procompetitive interests at stake,” the dissenting judge characterized
the key issue as “whether allowing student-athletes to be compensated for their NILs is ‘virtually
as effective’ in preserving popular demand for college sports as not allowing compensation.”112
He cited expert economist testimony that “consumer demand typically does not decrease when
athletes are permitted to receive payment, and that this general principle holds true across a wide
variety of sports and competitive formats.”113 In his view, this record evidence was sufficient to
107
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Id. at 1076–079. The district court rejected plaintiffs’ third proposed less restrictive
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109

Id. at 983.

110

O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076.

111

Id.

112

Id. at 1081 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).

113

Id.
21

affirm the district court’s finding that a $5,000 per year stipend is a substantially less restrictive
alternative to achieve this objective.
IV. Proposed Application of Section 1 to NCAA Input Market Restraints Affecting College
Athletes
O’Bannon generated petitions from both parties for a writ of certiorari expressing a wide
variety of views regarding how antitrust law should be judicially applied to NCAA studentathlete eligibility rules and input market restraints as well as its broader implications for the
sports industry. The NCAA asserted O’Bannon’s unprecedented ruling that its amateurism rules
violate section 1 conflicts with Board of Regents’ holding that “a defining feature” of
intercollegiate sports is that “participants must be amateur student-athletes,”114 which is
procompetitive and should be upheld as a matter of lawas Agnew, Smith, and McCormick did.
It also claimed that O’Bannon improperly applied a de facto least restrictive alternative standard
that improperly second-guesses business decisions to achieve legitimate objectives
“without . . . adding that much to competition.”115 In addition, the NCAA contended that
O’Bannon encourages antitrust challenges to its rules, and that it “should not have to undergo a
full trial (and years of litigation) or face treble damages whenever a plaintiff or counsel hits on a
supposedly better way to administer college athletics.”116
Three amicus briefs were filed in support of the NCAA’s petition. The Bar Association of the
District of Columbia Antitrust Law Section expressed concern that O’Bannon exposes
educational institutions to potentially broad antitrust liability for rules prohibiting or limiting
student-athlete compensation or athletic scholarships for high school sports and nonrevenue
generating intercollegiate sports. It advocated that the Supreme Court adopt the following
standard: “If the challenged restraint is reasonably necessary to create a new product, and if [it]
is socially beneficial (for example, if [it] increases output or consumer choice), then the restraint
likely increases consumer welfare, and is presumptively lawful under antitrust’s rule of
reason.”117 The National Federation of State High School Associations claimed that O’Bannon’s
“detailed and costly antitrust inquiry, one directed at the core function of defining ‘amateurism’
itself, promises to hinder the NCAA’s future efforts to halt the encroachment of professionalism,
with negative consequences for amateur athletics in colleges, and beyond,” including

114

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, NCAA v. O’Bannon, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016) (No. 151388), 2016 WL 2866087.
115

Id. at 25.

116

Id. at 26.

117

Brief of Amicus Curiae Bar Association of the District of Columbia Antitrust Law Section in
Support of Petitioner at 1-2, NCAA v. O’Bannon, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016) (No. 15-1388), 2016
WL 3345342.
22

interscholastic athletics.118 A group of twelve antitrust scholars agreed that O’Bannon
inappropriately applied a least restrictive alternative standard because “[o]nce the court found
that restricting payments to students was reasonably necessary to the amateurism/integration
justifications, it should not have condemned the restraints solely because it thought a different
level of athlete compensation was preferable to the level chosen by the NCAA.”119 “While
increasing allowable payments to students from full grant-in-aid to cost of attendance may be a
fairer policy,” they asserted that it “is not a judgment the antitrust laws authorize courts to
make.”120
The plaintiff student-athletes claimed that the O’Bannon majority’s adoption of
amateurism as a valid procompetitive interest in determining a proper remedy for the NCAA’s
antitrust violation contravenes Board of Regents by “remov[ing] the critical question—the effect
on consumers—from the analysis, making ‘amateurism’. . . an end in itself.”121 Their petition
also asserted that the majority inappropriately used less restrictive alternative analysis to require
plaintiffs to prove the district court’s remedy permitting them to receive deferred trust fund pro
rata compensation of $5,000 per year of intercollegiate athletics participation was justified. In
other words, this requirement “improperly would limit antitrust relief to injunctions that qualify
as ‘less restrictive alternatives’ under the Rule of Reason.”122
Federal appellate courts’ inconsistent application of section 1 to NCAA student-athlete
eligibility rules and the foregoing very different views of the parties and amici regarding the
important antitrust issues raised by O’Bannon illustrate the need for a principled framework for
determining the legality of NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and other input market
restraints. The following recommendations provide a principled framework for applying section
1 in a manner that promotes consumer welfare by permitting the NCAA to maintain the unique
features of college sports distinguishing them from professional sports, while prohibiting
predominantly anticompetitive NCAA rules without inappropriate judicial micromanagement of
intercollegiate athletics. They are consistent with Board of Regents as well as Supreme Court
and lower court precedent applying antitrust law to professional sports leagues. In addition,
these recommendations would provide guidance to lower courts in resolving pending antitrust
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litigation challenging the legality of other NCAA amateurism rules123 as well as other NCAA
input market restraints such as a prohibition on multi-year athletic scholarships and cap on their
maximum number124 and rules preventing Division I basketball and football players from
transferring to other NCAA Division I schools without losing athletic eligibility for a year.125
A. NCAA Student-Athlete Eligibility Rules and Input Market Restrictions Generally Are
Commercial Restraints
As Board of Regents recognized, NCAA universities are competitors for student-athletes’
enrollment as students and their playing services as intercollegiate athletes. In American Needle,
the Supreme Court held that rules and agreements among separate economic entities in a joint
venture such as a sports league are not immune from section 1 scrutiny merely because their
cooperation is necessary to produce their product of sports competition. O’Bannon and Agnew
appropriately characterized an athletic scholarship, which is a contract between a university and
its student-athletes, as a commercial transaction because it is the underlying basis of a
relationship that has substantial economic value for both parties. This view is consistent with
123

There are a group of cases in which Division I men’s and women’s basketball and FBS
football players seek to recover treble damages for NCAA rules limiting the value of their
athletic scholarships to less than the full cost-of-attendance in violation of section 1. See, e.g.,
Hartman v. NCAA, No. 4:15-cv-00178 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 13, 2015); Gregory-McGhee v.
NCAA, No. 4:14-cv-01777 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 17, 2014); Alston v. NCAA, No. 3:14-cv-01011
(N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 5, 2014). In Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 3:14-cv-01678 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 17,
2014), a group of current and former Division I basketball and FBS football players allege that
the NCAA, Pacific 12 Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big Twelve Conference, Southeastern
Conference, and Atlantic Coast Conference “entered into what amounts to cartel agreements
with the avowed purpose and effect of placing a ceiling on the compensation that may be paid to
these athletes for their services [which] are pernicious, a blatant violation of the antitrust laws,
have no legitimate pro-competitive justification, and should now be struck down and enjoined”
so that the free market can determine the economic value and components of athletic
scholarships for Division I basketball and FBS football players. Jenkins was consolidated with
those cases and transferred to the Northern District of California before the O’Bannon district
court judge. On August 5, 2016, the court denied the NCAA’s motion to dismiss these
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Brown University’s determination that a university’s award of financial aid to students is a
commercial transaction to which the Sherman Act is applicable.
NCAA rules are incorporated into its member universities’ athletic scholarships, and
student-athlete compliance with these rules is a condition of their eligibility to compete in
intercollegiate athletics. NCAA amateurism rules “restrict the compensation or things of value
that student-athletes may receive or the ways by which they earn compensation”126 and prohibit
any price competition among NCAA schools for student-athletes’ playing services. To maintain
their eligibility to play intercollegiate athletics, NCAA amateurism rules also prohibit studentathletes from receiving any economic benefits or preferential treatment (e.g., free or reduced
price goods or services) based on their athletic achievements or fame from others.127 NCAA
academic eligibility requirements have commercial effects by eliminating an element of nonprice competition among universities, which prevents athletes who do not satisfy them from
receiving the economic benefits of free or reduced price higher education. NCAA transfer rules
have similar commercial effects by generally requiring a student-athlete who transfers from any
member institution to another one to complete a full year of academic residence before being
eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics, which may preclude the receipt of an athletic
scholarship with corresponding adverse economic effects.128
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Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2647
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See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 12, art. 16.02.3 (defining an “extra benefit” as “any special
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to provide a student-athlete or the student-athlete family member or friend a benefit not expressly
authorized by NCAA legislation.”). See also id. art. 16.2.2 (outlining procedures that are
“nonpermissible” for student-athletes, their families, or third-parties when it comes to tickets
provided to student-athletes for athletic events); id. art. 16.11.2 (defining specific
“nonpermissible” benefits for student-athletes).
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Sarah M. Konsky, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1581, 1596 (2003) (suggesting that transfer rules are “sufficiently commercial to warrant
antitrust scrutiny ” because they “further schools’ commercial interests in maintaining highquality athletic programs”). The NCAA manuals at all three divisional levels have transfer rules
listed under article 14.5; each manual states: “A student who transfers to a member institution
from any collegiate institution is required to complete one full academic year of residence at the
certifying institution before being eligible to compete for or to receive travel expenses from the
member institution, unless the student satisfies the applicable transfer requirements or qualifies
for an exception as set forth in this bylaw.”NCAA MANUAL, supra note 12, art. 14.5.1; 2016–17
NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL art. 14.5.1 (2016); 2016–17 NCAA DIVISION III MANUAL art. 14.5.1
(2016).
25

Other NCAA input market restraints, such as prohibiting multi-year athletic scholarships
or per sport caps on their number, eliminate economic competition among universities for
student-athletes. Applying Agnew, in Rock v. NCAA, a federal district court ruled that NCAA
limits on the maximum number of Division I football scholarships its member universities could
award (eighty-five for Football Bowl Series (FBS) teams, and sixty-three for Football
Championship Series (FCS) teams) and prohibitions against multi-year scholarships constitute
commercial activity subject to section 1.129
However, it would not be appropriate to characterize all NCAA input market regulation
as commercial restraints subject to antitrust scrutiny. In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court
recognized that the production of intercollegiate sports requires agreement among NCAA
members regarding “[a] myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of the field, the
number of players on a team, and extent to which physical violence is to be encouraged or
proscribed.”130 Although “all restrain the manner in which [NCAA] institutions compete,” it
would not make sense to classify the rules of the game as commercial restraints.131 Based on
Board of Regents and because of their de minis anticompetitive effects, NCAA rules and
regulation to protect student-athlete health and safety (e.g., pre-participation or return to play
medical clearance requirements; drug testing program and sanctions) also are not commercial
restraints subject to section 1.132
B. All NCAA Student-Athlete Eligibility Rules Are Subject to Rule of Reason Analysis Except
Academic Eligibility Requirements, Which Should Be Valid As a Matter of Law
For the same reasons that NCAA student-athlete eligibility rulesexcept player safety
regulationsare commercial restraints, it is inappropriate to interpret Board of Regents as
creating a presumption that all student-athlete eligibility rules, particularly amateurism rules that
fix student-athletes’ compensation, are valid as a matter of law. Board of Regents involved a
section 1 challenge to an NCAA output market restraint, its exclusive college football television
plan that eliminated competition among its member schools regarding the sale of rights to their
football games. It did not consider the antitrust validity of any NCAA student-athlete eligibility
rules, much less hold that any of them are per se legal. Rather, it held that a price fixing
129
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Roberts, supra note 126, at 2633 (“It is unlikely that anyone would seriously allege that
‘agreements’ by members of an athletic organization defining the shape and size of playing
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antitrust questions.”).
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Neeld v. Nat’l Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (holding that a NHL bylaw excluding a
one-eyed hockey player from the league does not violate section 1 as a matter of law because it
“is not motivated by anticompetitiveness . . . any anticompetitive effect is at most de minimis
[and it is] incidental to the primary purpose of promoting safety”).
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agreement among NCAA member schools imposes “a heavy burden of establishing an
affirmative defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the operations of a
free market.”133 Consistent with American Needle and Law, O’Bannon held that a price fixing
agreement among sports league or organization members is subject to rule of reason scrutiny. It
properly rejected contrary holdings by Bassett and McCormack as well as Agnew’s broad view
that “[m]ost—if not all—eligibility rules” are presumptively procompetitive.
In contrast to the NCAA’s rules fixing student-athletes’ compensation from its member
schools and prohibiting their receipt of economic benefits from other sources, its academic
eligibility requirements (e.g., initial eligibility and progress towards degree rules) define the core
or essential characteristics of its unique brand of athletic competition among intercollegiate
student-athletes. In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court observed that “the NCAA seeks to
market a particular brand of football—college football” and “the identification of this ‘product’
with an academic tradition differentiates [it]” from professional sports.134 It concluded that “the
preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to
intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.”135 In
O’Bannon, although the challenged restraint was not an NCAA academic eligibility rule, both
the Ninth Circuit and district court determined that “integrating academics and athletics” is a
procompetitive justification.136 Accordingly, it is appropriate that NCAA academic eligibility
requirements, although properly characterized as commercial restraints, be presumed to be
procompetitive and valid as a matter of law without rule of reason analysis.137
C. Judicial Application of the Rule of Reason Should Be Consistent With Antitrust Law
Objectives
A renowned antitrust law scholar describes the prevailing application of the rule of
reason as follows:
Today, the courts pursue rule of reason analysis through a verbal sequence
something like this: first, the plaintiff has the burden to show a prima facie
anticompetitive restraint, which requires proof of power and a threat of
anticompetitive effects. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show some
133
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justification for the restraint. If the defendant succeeds, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff, who can then show that the proffered justification was either a
pretense or else that a substantially equivalent benefit could be achieved by a less
restrictive alternative. If a less restrictive alternative is available, the court
condemns the restraint because the same effects could have been achieved in a
less anticompetitive manner. If no such alternative is offered or available, the
court must balance the anticompetitive effects of the restraint against the
nonpretextual defense.138
Although NCAA input market restraints with clear anticompetitive effects and no
procompetitive justifications (e.g., REC rule) can be invalidated under a “quick look” or
truncated rule of reason, as occurred in Law, Board of Regents generally requires use of the full
rule of reason in analyzing NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules or other input market restraints
adversely affecting their economic interests. In analyzing the NIL compensation rules,
O’Bannon applied a three-step full rule of reason process, which considers a restraint’s
anticompetitive effects, procompetitive effects, and less restrictive alternatives without any
balancing to determine its net competitive effects.139
By contrast, Law’s full rule of reason analysis consists of four-steps, with the last one
requiring such balancing if the parties satisfy their respective burdens under the first three steps:
[T]he plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that an agreement has a
substantially adverse effect on competition. . . . If the plaintiff meets this burden,
the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence of the
procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct. . . . If the defendant is
able to demonstrate procompetitive effects, the plaintiff then must prove that the
challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate
objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a substantially less
restrictive manner. . . . Ultimately, if these steps are met, the harms and benefits
must be weighed against each other in order to judge whether the challenged
behavior is, on balance, reasonable.140
1. NCAA Input Market Restraints Have Significant Anticompetitive Effects Requiring
Procompetitive Justification
Because NCAA member universities compete for the services of student-athletes, NCAA
student-athlete eligibility rules and other input market restraints preclude or limit intrabrand
competition. Relying on Mandeville Island Farms, the O’Bannon district court rejected the
NCAA’s assertion that plaintiffs must prove that this restraint “harms consumers by reducing
138
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output or raising prices in a downstream market”141 (i.e., reduces interbrand competition in the
sports entertainment market). This ruling, which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,142 correctly
interprets Mandeville Island Farms and is consistent with Law as well as other cases holding that
professional sports labor market restraints have significant anticompetitive effects under section
1 even without harming consumers.
Like the REC rule in Law, the NCAA’s amateurism eligibility rules fix prices in the input
market for the production of college sports. Over time the REC rule would harm consumer
welfare by reducing the quality of intercollegiate athletics by misallocating labor market
resources because coaches would refuse to accept artificially low salaries and seek alternative
employment outside of college sports.143 Although the NIL compensation rules precluded
student-athletes from receiving any compensation for their NIL rights, their effects on consumer
welfare are uncertain. It also is difficult to accurately determine or predict whether other NCAA
amateurism eligibility rules also cause a similar misallocation of student-athlete playing services
with adverse consumer welfare effects.
These restraints may reduce the quality of intercollegiate athletics to the detriment of
consumer welfare by reducing the quantity of eligible student-athletes or by causing them to turn
professional earlier than if such rules did not exist in a free market. The NBA and NFL CBAs
establish legally enforceable player eligibility rules that preclude employment in the NBA until
reaching the age of nineteen years old, and in the NFL until three years have elapsed since
graduating from high school, respectively.144 After satisfying these requirements, studentathletes with remaining college eligibility may choose to pursue an NBA or NFL career rather
than continuing to play NCAA basketball or football without any payment or economic benefits
in excess of the value of a full cost-of-attendance scholarship. As the Ninth Circuit observed:
“athletes might well be more likely to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew that
they were earning some amount of NIL income while they were in school.”145
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Even if the NCAA’s amateurism eligibility rules do not cause a misallocation of
resources that harms consumer welfare, NIL compensation rules and other rules prohibiting price
competition among NCAA schools likely transfer wealth from student-athletes to universities
and third parties such as coaches earning high salaries, which arguably is an anticompetitive
effect.146
2. Judicially Accepted Procompetitive Justifications Should Enhance Consumer Welfare
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA has a “heavy burden” of
establishing a procompetitive objective that justifies a restraint’s anticompetitive effects. 147
O’Bannon required the NCAA to prove the restraint “brings about some procompetitive effect in
order to justify it” under the rule of reason.148 Because “the Sherman Act [is] a ‘consumer
welfare prescription,’”149 Board of Regents recognized product availability/differentiation,
competitive balance, and increased output as procompetitive justifications for NCAA rules and
regulations that eliminate or reduce intrabrand economic competition among NCAA schools. In
other words, the NCAA must prove that a student-athlete eligibility rule or input market restraint
causing significant anticompetitive effects in an intrabrand market has offsetting procompetitive
effects in the interbrand entertainment market. In general, this effectively requires the NCAA to
establish that the restraint benefits consumers of intercollegiate athletics.
a. Product Availability/Differentiation
Intercollegiate and professional sports have several distinguishing features and are
different brands of entertainment for a variety of reasons. In general, the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that “[t]he identification of [intercollegiate athletics] with an academic
tradition differentiates [it] from . . . professional sports to which it might otherwise be
comparable”150 and that “the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds
richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics.”151 More specifically, NFL football differs
from NCAA Division I FBS football (just as NBA basketball differs from Division I men’s
basketball) because of their differing quality of athletes, caliber of on-field competition, length of
season, and methods of determining teams that participate in postseason championship
competition.
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In Board of Regents dicta, the Court conflated amateurism with its clearly recognized and
economically sound procompetitive defenses of brand differentiation and competitive balance by
stating “[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product’ [college sports], athletes
must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”152 It also stated that
“maintaining competitive balance among amateur athletic teams is legitimate and important”153
and noted the “revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.”154 The Court also assumed
that “fostering competition among amateur athletic teams” is a procompetitive means of
“enhance[ing] public interest in intercollegiate athletics.”155
For purposes of determining the underlying basis of a sports entertainment product’s
availability or brand differentiation, “[t]he relevant antitrust question is whether [an intrabrand
restraint is necessary to] create a qualitatively distinct type of athlete and athletic product that,
because of its distinctiveness, provides a large number of consumers with a product they greatly
desire and could not otherwise get.”156 It is not generally accepted or readily apparent that the
NCAA-defined “amateur” status of student-athletes is the determinative or primary factoror
even a significant onethat distinguishes college and professional sports for purposes of their
consumer appeal.157 Rather than making any unwarranted assumptions, “the question of how
much of the consumer utility generated by intercollegiate athletics is dependent upon the
limitations on athlete compensation is one of fact that would have to be developed in a full
record,” for example, by surveys and statistical evidence.158
In a pretrial ruling, the O’Bannon district court held that whether amateurism increases
the popularity of Division I sports is a fact question to be resolved at trial because the parties’
evidence is conflicting.159 The NCAA’s experts contended that historically “consumers generally
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favor the amateur nature of college sports,” and 68.9% of consumers in a recent survey were
opposed to paying college football and basketball players.160 Plaintiffs’ evidence “that the
NCAA has changed its definition of amateurism several times over the years without
significantly affecting consumer demand for its product”161 suggests that the popularity of
college sports is unrelated to the NCAA’s amateurism rules.
At trial, the court found that “consumer demand for FBS football and Division I
basketball-related products is not driven by the restrictions on student-athlete compensation but
instead by other factors such as school loyalty and geography.”162 However, it concluded:
the NCAA’s restrictions on student-athlete compensation play a limited role in
driving consumer demand for FBS football and Division I basketball-related
products. Although they might justify a restriction on large payments to studentathletes while in school, they do not justify the rigid prohibition on compensating
student-athletes, in the present or future, with any share of licensing revenue
generated from the use of their names, images, and likenesses.163
The O’Bannon Ninth Circuit panel broadly construed this factual finding by determining
that “the amateur nature of collegiate sports increases their appeal to consumers.”164 It suggested
that NCAA-defined amateurism is itself a procompetitive justification, which is contrary to trial
evidence that “consumer demand typically does not decrease when athletes are permitted to
receive payment, and that this general principle holds true across a wide variety of sports and
competitive formats.”165 More specifically, four experts testified “that providing student-athletes
with small amounts of compensation above their cost of attendance would not have a significant
impact on consumer interest in college sports.”166 The dissent appropriately concluded that “the
concept of amateurism is relevant only insofar as it relates to consumer interest.”167 Thus, a
more accurate, evidence based conclusion is that maintaining “amateurism” is not a separate and
distinct procompetitive justification for anticompetitive NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules
and other input market restraints. Rather, the NCAA’s amateurism rules are merely one factor
differentiating intercollegiate and professional sports for purposes of product differentiation,
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which has important implications likely to be outcome determinative in analyzing whether a
particular restraint actually furthers this procompetitive objective.
b. Competitive Balance
Because doing so ostensibly increases product quality and consumer welfare, Board of
Regents and American Needle held that promoting on-field competitive balance among sports
teams is a procompetitive justification for intrabrand restraints on the market for intercollegiate
or professional player services.168 “Competitive balance” has the dual meaning of “parity”
(i.e., the extent to which all teams playing at the same level are able to play close and
exciting games during a season of competition) and “potential to change” (i.e., teams’
ability to improve their relative performance in terms of on- field success vis-à-vis other
teams over time).169 As applied to NCAA regulation of intercollegiate athletics, the
determinative issue “is whether restricting the ways individual schools can ‘compete’ to improve
their relative athletic strength enhances either parity or the ability for relative change in rankings”170
among schools whose athletic teams regularly compete against each other.
The O’Bannon district court held that “a sports league’s efforts to achieve the optimal
competitive balance among its teams may serve a procompetitive purpose if promoting such
competitive balance increases demand for the league’s product.”171 Although promoting
competitive balance among Division I FBS football and basketball teams is a legitimate
procompetitive justification, it rejected this defense because “the NCAA did not present
sufficient evidence . . . that its restrictions on student-athlete compensation actually have any
effect on competitive balance, let alone produce an optimal level of competitive balance.”172
The court’s standard is consistent with the consumer welfare objectives of antitrust law as
well as judicial precedent rejecting the claims of professional sports leagues that player labor
market restraints are necessary to promote competitive balance.173 However, it imposes a high
burden of proof on the NCAA, which may be more than Supreme Court precedent requires.
Even if the NCAA only needs to prove that a challenged restraint is reasonably necessary to
promote competitive balance, it will be very difficult to justify any student-athlete eligibility
168
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rules or input market restraints applicable to all of its more than 1,100 member schools. NCAA
schools generally compete regularly only against others within their respective NCAA divisions
(e.g., Division I FBS and FCS, II, and III) and athletic conferences, so the vast majority of
association wide student-athlete amateurism eligibility rules (e.g., an absolute prohibition against
student-athletes’ individualized commercial exploitation of their NIL rights) or input market
restraints likely are overbroad and may not survive less restrictive alternative analysis.174
c. Increasing Output of Intercollegiate Athletics
Consistent with Board of Regents,175 the O’Bannon district court held that increasing
“the total ‘output’ of Division I football and basketball, as measured by the total
number of teams, players, scholarships, and games . . . is potentially procompetitive
because it increases output in the relevant market.”176 At trial, it found that the
NCAA’s NIL compensation rules do not increase output in this market because the
NCAA did not prove that “a significant number of schools choose to compete in
Division I because of a ‘philosophical commitment to amateurism.” 177 Moreover,
“to the extent that schools achieve any cost savings by not paying their studentathletes, there is no evidence that those cost savings are being used to fund
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eligibility to compete at Division I intercollegiate athletics in the future.
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additional teams or scholarships.”178
The court rejected the NCAA’s defense that its amateurism rules enable its
member schools to offer and fund women’s sports and less popular men’s sports
because it “is not a legitimate procompetitive justification.”179 It explained: “The
NCAA cannot restrain competition in the ‘college education’ market for Division I football
and basketball recruits or in the ‘group licensing’ market for Division I football and
basketball teams' publicity rights in order to promote competition in those markets for
women’s sports or less prominent men’s sports.”180
Its rejection of cross subsidization as a procompetitive defense to NCAA
amateurism rules that fix prices for student-athletes’ playing services is consistent with
Brown University, which held that the Ivy Overlap Group’s agreement to eliminate price
competition for talented students “cannot be justified solely on the basis of social welfare
concerns” such as increasing the socioeconomic diversity of their student bodies.181
d. Integration of Education and Athletics
In O’Bannon, both the district court and Ninth Circuit held that integrating academics and
178
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athletics, and NCAA rules mandating that Division I FBS universities offer a minimum number
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the profit-maximizing athletic director, one would expect ‘surplus’ nonrevenue sports to be cut
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one scholar asserts that considering their substantial economic costs and that similar social
benefits could be achieved by operating them as club or Division III sports, “it becomes difficult
to conclude that continued subsidization of these sports [by revenue generating sports] is
warranted as a matter of public policy.” Stephen F. Ross, Radical Reform of Intercollegiate
Athletics: Antitrust and Public Policy Implications, 86 TUL. L. REV. 933, 944 (2012).
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athletics is a procompetitive justification because it enhances the quality of higher education
services provided to student-athletes.182 Both courts rejected the NCAA’s defense that denying
student-athletes any compensation other than athletic scholarships, including specifically
pursuant to its NIL compensation rules, achieves this objective.183 Absent this restraint, the
district court found that “schools’ incentives to support their student-athletes academically would
remain changed,” so they would satisfy NCAA academic progress rules and remain eligible to
participate in intercollegiate athletics.184 It also found that absent this restraint, student-athletes’
incentive to perform well academically would not decline and might even increase if “if they
were required to meet these academic requirements as a condition of receiving [NIL
compensation].”185 The court concluded “the NCAA may not use this goal to justify its sweeping
prohibition on any student-athlete compensation, paid now or in the future, from licensing
revenue generated from the use of student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses,”186 with
which the Ninth Circuit majority disagreed in applying less restrictive alternative analysis.187
3. Less Restrictive Alternative Analysis: A Useful Tool To Invalidate Restraints Not
Reasonably Necessary To Produce Intercollegiate Athletics
Although its use has not been explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court, lower courts
generally use less restrictive alternative analysis in applying the rule of reason.188 Most circuit
courts require the plaintiff to prove the existence of a less restrictive alternative, which varies in
a range from what is “‘least restrictive’ to ‘reasonably necessary’” to achieve the defendant’s
procompetitive objectives.189 It considers possible alternative action other than the challenged
restraint to achieve a procompetitive objective and avoids the need for judicial determination and
comparison of net competitive effects in a market with and without the challenged restraint.190
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Properly applied, less restrictive alternative analysis is a useful judicial analytical tool to
determine if a sports industry restraint is reasonably necessary in cases in which there are
anticompetitive effects in one market (e.g., reduction of intrabrand competition in the player
services input market) and procompetitive effects in another market (e.g., promotion of
interbrand competition in the entertainment market). In unique industries such as professional or
intercollegiate sports that require agreements among competing clubs or universities to produce
on-field competition in a form attractive to consumers, there is the danger that it “can be used in
almost any case to strike down otherwise procompetitive rules”191 or to judicially micromanage
their production. To ameliorate this risk, the plaintiff should have the burden of proving a
“dominant alternative” that is “not only less restrictive, but also equally (or more) effective” in
achieving defendant’s procompetitive objective.192
In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit required plaintiffs to prove that the NCAA’s
procompetitive objectives of promoting amateurism and integrating academics with athletics
“can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.”193 This is the same standard adopted
by Law and Smith in applying less restrictive alternative analysis to other NCAA and
professional sports league input market restraints that reduce intrabrand competition for the
services of coaches and professional athletes.194 The court acknowledged Board of Regents’
admonition to “generally afford the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to superintend college sports”195 as
well as that “courts should not use antitrust law to make marginal adjustments to broadly
reasonable market restraints” or tweak every market restraint that the court believes could be
improved .”196 It required plaintiffs to “make a strong evidentiary showing its alternatives are
viable” (i.e., “‘virtually as effective’ in serving the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA’s
current rules and ‘without significantly increased cost’”).197
Applying this standard, which effectively required the plaintiffs to prove a “dominant
alternative,” the Ninth Circuit ruled that allowing NCAA universities to provide full cost-ofattendance scholarships “would have virtually no impact on amateurism . . . because all the
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money given to students would be going to cover their ‘legitimate costs’ to attend school.”198 It
also would not impede their integration of student-athletes into their academic communities.
Because new NCAA rules that became effective after the district court’s decision currently
permit schools to offer full cost-of-attendance scholarships, it found that this alternative would
not significantly increase their costs.
Based on its ruling that maintaining amateurism is a legitimate procompetitive
justification, the O’Bannon majority used less restrictive alternative analysis to rule that the
NCAA’s former rules capping the value of an athletic scholarship below the full cost-ofattendance is broader than reasonably necessary to achieve this objective. This holding enables
the NCAA to maintain the unique core characteristic of intercollegiate athletics (i.e., its academic
tradition), which is a significant distinguishing factor vis-à-vis professional sports, and does not
inhibit the integration of student-athletes into universities. Although this holding effectively
redefines NCAA “amateurism” and arguably does constitute the application of a de facto least
restrictive alternative standard in this particular case, invalidating the NIL zero compensation
rules is judicially appropriate because this restraint “is patently and inexplicably stricter than
necessary.”199 In principle, this stringent standard appropriately precludes the use of less
restrictive alternative analysis to invalidate NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules and input
market restraints that are reasonably necessary to further procompetitive objectives. If adopted
and followed by other courts, it should avoid judicial micromanaging of intercollegiate athletics.
The O’Bannon majority reversed the district court’s determination that allowing Division
I basketball and FBS football players to receive $5,000 cash stipends for their NIL rights after
their intercollegiate athletics career ends is a substantially less restrictive alternative. By
definition, allowing them to receive compensation “untethered to their education expenses” is
not a “virtually as effective” means of maintaining amateurism in NCAA athletics. In other
words, despite the substantially commercialized nature of Division I basketball and FBS football,
the majority holds that all NIL rights compensation received by those who currently or formerly
played these two sports must be tethered to the costs of their educational opportunities.200
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Some commentators have suggested that permitting former players to receive NIL
compensation if they maintained their academic eligibility while playing intercollegiate sports
and use this money only for educational purposes would be an even less restrictive alternative
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Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 101, 123-124 (2016). Other possibilities are an NCAA postgraduate
scholarship program or the payment of academic achievement awards to former intercollegiate
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with Title IX gender equity requirements that require proportionately equal benefits and
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If maintaining amateurism is relevant only to the extent necessary to distinguish
intercollegiate and professional sports from the perspective of consumers, the dissent’s view that
the district court properly used less restrictive analysis to fashion a remedy to achieve this
objective is incorrect. Based on the record evidence, principled rule of reason analysis consistent
with the objectives of antitrust law would have required the district court to rule that NCAA rules
fixing student-athletes’ NIL compensation at zero are not reasonably necessary to maintain the
limited role of amateurism in product differentiation and, therefore, are illegal and
unenforceable. Its use of less restrictive alternative analysis to judicially determine a reasonable
amount of NIL rights compensation for student-athletes is erroneous because “[t]he point of the
less restrictive alternative test is not to turn the antitrust court into a price regulator, but rather to
find competitive alternatives to a challenged restraint.”201 However, the appropriate antitrust
remedy of simply invalidating the NCAA’s zero NIL compensation rules, which would enable
free market competition to determine student-athletes’ payments from their respective
universities and third parties for use of their NILs, would be the first step towards
professionalization of intercollegiate sports with corresponding adverse consequences. 202
Although it needs to be applied with judicial caution and consistent with the stringent
O’Bannon standard, the use of less restrictive alternative analysis may be particularly useful in
determining whether challenged NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules (e.g., transfer rules) or
other input market restraints (e.g., per sport limits on the number of athletic scholarships) are
reasonably necessary to achieve competitive balance in intercollegiate athletics. An NCAA or
Division-wide restraint may be overbroad; a substantially less restrictive alternative that achieves
legitimate procompetitive objectives relevant to intercollegiate sports may be permitting athletic
conferences within NCAA Divisions to independently establish their own rules, just as NCAA
autonomy legislation is enabling the Division I Power Five conferences to do.203 For example, a
conference rule imposing an academic residency requirement for intra-conference student-athlete
transfers is much less restrictive than a similar NCAA or Division rule that applies nationwide.204
treatment for both female and male intercollegiate athletes. Mitten, Musselman & Burton, supra
note 4 at 841-842.
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Some have suggested that “the shifting of amateurism rules from the national level to the
conference level, with individual conferences competing against one another to set the most
desirable terms of athlete employment”205 as a possible less restrictive alternative. However, this
would require judicial rejection of an amateur model of intercollegiate athletics with all
payments to student-athletes tethered to the costs of educational opportunities. On the other
hand, courts should not improperly micromanage NCAA governance of intercollegiate athletics
by tweaking restrictions proven as a matter of fact to further competitive balance among
university athletic teams that regularly play games and compete in championship competitions
against each other; for example, by enjoining enforcement of the current rule capping Division I
FBS football scholarship at eighty-five in favor of a cap of ninety scholarships.
4. Balancing Anticompetitive and Procompetitive Effects
O’Bannon and Law disagree regarding whether a fourth step, the balancing of
anticompetitive effects, is a necessary requirement of full rule of reason analysis if the parties
satisfy their respective burdens of proof. Although this is an important issue of general antitrust
jurisprudence and Law represents the majority judicial view,206 the antitrust validity of most
NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules or other input market restraints can be judicially
determined without any balancing to determine the net competitive effects of the restraint, which
is a very complex and difficult endeavor.207 One scholar has observed: “In the vast majority of
rule of reason cases, even complex ones like O’Bannon, real balancing is not necessary. The
series of steps—first prima facie case, then defense, and occasionally inquiry into less restrictive
alternatives—will be sufficient.”208 Although one scholar suggests that the O’Bannon majority
erred by not balancing the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the NIL zero
compensation rules after determining that permitting a $5,000 stipend is not a less restrictive
205
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alternative,209 doing so would not have changed their remedy of permitting plaintiffs to receive a
stipend not to exceed the value of a full cost-of-attendance athletic scholarship at their respective
universities.
Conclusion
Case-by-case litigation to resolve the antitrust validity of particular NCAA studentathlete eligibility rules is not an optimal method of externally regulating intercollegiate sports
competition among nonprofit institutions of higher education. It has resulted in conflicting
judicial decisions creating legal uncertainty rather than a principled and predictable application
of antitrust law as well as being very expensive210 and time consuming.211 In applying antitrust
law, with the exception of O’Bannon, courts traditionally have been very deferential to the
NCAA and upheld its self-defined amateurism regulations without close scrutiny under the rule
of reason. This approach is consistent with judicial, NLRB, and state legislative refusals to
professionalize intercollegiate athletics by characterizing student-athletes as “employees” under
labor, employment, and worker’s compensation laws, but it is inconsistent with general and
professional sports antitrust law principles. To enable the achievement of legitimate social
welfare objectives in higher education (which are not procompetitive objectives for purposes of
antitrust law), an alternative system of regulating intercollegiate athletics that provides antitrust
immunity is a better legal regime. The use of antitrust law is a second best solution, but judicial
adoption of the foregoing recommendations will better promote consumer welfare, protect
student-athletes’ economic rights, and permit the NCAA to promote the unique features of
intercollegiate sports without unwarranted judicial micromanagement.
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